Sanjay Banerjee, PhD, MBA, BTech.
Associate Professor, Alberta School of Business - Department of Accounting and Business Analytics
- (780) 492-6774
3-40N Business Building
11203 Saskatchewan Drive NWEdmonton ABT6G 2R6
Area of Study / Keywords
Disclosure; ESG in Accounting; Accounting Standards & Regulations; Financial Analysts
I am an associate professor of accounting, and I teach managerial and financial accounting at the Alberta School of Business. I study corporate disclosure, and related accounting standards and regulations using information economics, cognitive science and accounting theory. I use complementary research methodologies including analytical modeling, laboratory experiments, and archival methods. My research has been published in the Journal of Accounting Research, Management Science, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Organization Science, and funded by Social Sciences and Humanities Council (SSHRC), Government of Canada. I am a member of the Canadian Sustainable Finance Network (CSFN).
Before becoming a professor, I spent 8 years in industry. I graduated from the Indian Institute of Technology (I.I.T.), Kharagpur (BTech), XLRI Xavier School of Management, India (MBA), and the University of Minnesota (PhD).
SSRN author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1887697
1) Banerjee, S., H. Que, and R. Zhao. 2022. Clarity trumps content: An experiment on information acquisition in beauty contests. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 145, 381-407.
When investors can access multiple information sources (e.g., firm disclosures, analyst reports, news and social media), strong coordination (beauty contest) incentives can lead them to ignore a firm disclosure if it is not sufficiently clear. Instead, investors may focus on information sources with high clarity but low content such as rumors and even fake news.
2) Banerjee, S. 2021. Does competition improve analysts' forecast informativeness? Management Science. 67(5), 3219-3238.
Not always. Competition for higher rankings in forecast accuracy can reduce the informativeness of analyst forecasts. More intense competition can make forecasts less informative.
3) Banerjee, S., and M. Maier. 2016. Public information precision and coordination failure: An experiment. Journal of Accounting Research. 54(4), 941-985.
Greater transparency can lead to inferior economic outcomes such as coordination failures (bank runs) when public information is pessimistic. As such, a coarser, aggregated disclosure can be better (than a granular, dis-aggregated disclosure) in reducing coordination failures.
4) Zaheer, A., E. Hernandez, and S. Banerjee. 2010. Prior alliances with targets and acquisition performance in knowledge-intensive industries. Organization Science. 21(5), 1072 - 1091.
Prior alliances with a target company can improve the performance of an acquiring company when there is a large information asymmetry between the target and the acquirer (as in knowledge-intensive industries such as biotech and software).
5) Voluntary climate disclosure by firms: A tale of two venues (with A. Chen, M. Li, V. Mehrotra, and R. Vijayaraghavan).
6) Information acquisition and disclosure in forecasting contests (with E. Einhorn and N. Langberg).
In a forecasting contest, in which financial analysts strategically acquire and disclose information, sufficiently high rewards can (i) induce analysts to make untruthful forecasts; (ii) discourage weaker analysts' information production; and (iii) reduce the price efficiency of analyst forecasts.
7) Clear and liquid: The interaction of firm disclosure and trader competition (with Efstathios Avdis).
Accuracy of disclosure (i.e., how accurately a disclosure reports a company's future value) and clarity of disclosure (i.e., how well traders understand the disclosed information) have qualitatively different effects on trading in financial markets. Low-clarity disclosure can reduce a company's market liquidity and trading volume.