Claudia M. Landeo, PhD Economics, MA Economics, MPA Public Policy

Professor of Economics, Faculty of Arts - Economics Dept

Contact

Professor of Economics, Faculty of Arts - Economics Dept
Email
landeo@ualberta.ca

Overview

About

[Dr. Landeo's Website]

Dr. Claudia Landeo is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics of the University of Alberta. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in 2002, where she was the recipient of the Andrew W. Mellon Award and the Reuben E. Slesinger Research Award. Professor Landeo has served as Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School (2011-2012) and Senior Research Scholar in Law at Harvard Law School (2012). Dr. Landeo has also served as Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law (2011, 2009-2010), Research Scholar in Economics at Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management (2007), and Visiting Associate Professor of Economics (2006-2007) and Research Scholar in Economics (2005) at Carnegie Mellon University John H. Heinz School.

Professor Landeo's work has been published in top general-interest economics journals such as The American Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, and The RAND Journal of Economics, top law and economics journals such as The Journal of Law and Economics and The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,  and top law journals such as The Yale Journal on Regulation and The University of Chicago Law Review. Her research has been funded by major granting agencies such as the Russell Sage Foundation and the National Science Foundation.



Research

Professor Landeo's research is focused on the Economic Analysis of Law. She applies game-theoretic modeling, experimental economics methods, and legal analysis to the assessment and design of market and legal institutions. Her theoretical work on the economic analysis of legal disputes, published in Games and Economic Behavior (2018), generalizes seminal economic models of litigation, presents the first formal definition of "Access to Justice," and provides methodological contributions to the economic analysis of law. She presented the findings from this study at the NBER Summer Institute in Law and Economics in July 2016. Professor Landeo's theoretical work on the design of optimal law enforcement mechanisms with ordered leniency, published in The Journal of Law and Economics (2020), extends seminal work on the control of harmful externalities and provides the first formal analysis of enforcement policies with ordered leniency for short-term harmful group activities. She discussed her findings at the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in May 2019 and at the NBER Summer Institute in Law and Economics in July 2018.

Dr. Landeo has also studied the efficiency properties of bargaining institutions in legal settings including partnership dissolution provisions and pretrial bargaining mechanisms. In addition, her work has provided insights about the use of vertical restraints by incumbent monopolists to exclude potential entrants, and the design of incentive contracts for teams. Professor Landeo is currently working on the design of optimal legal systems, leniency mechanisms and corruption, and debiasing through law mechanisms. 



Areas of Interest

Economic Analysis of Law

Industrial Organization

Game Theory

Mechanism Design

Experimental and Behavioral Economics



Representative Publications

Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes (with Maxim Nikitin). Games & Economic Behavior, 109, pp. 625-647 (2018). Journal of the Game Theory Society

Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency (with Kathryn Spier).  The Journal of Law & Economics, 63, pp. 71-111 (2020). University of Chicago Press

Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities (with Kathryn Spier). The American Economic Review, 99, pp. 1850-1877 (2009). Journal of the American Economic Association        

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts (with Richard Brooks and Kathryn Spier). The Rand Journal of Economics, 41, pp. 649-673 (2010). Journal of the RAND Corporation

  • Article cited  by Judge Dowd in the legal case Forbush v. Adams, [2014] No. ED101290, Missouri Court of Appeals, Easter District - U.S.A.                                                    
  • Article cited by Justice Edelman in the legal case JTA Le Roux v. Lawson, [2013] WASC 293, Supreme Court of Western Australia – Australia

Shotguns and Deadlocks (with Kathryn Spier). The Yale Journal on Regulation, 31, pp. 143-187 (2014). Yale University Press

  • Article featured in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation (2013) 

Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock (with Kathryn Spier). The University of Chicago Law Review, 81, pp. 203-229 (2014). University of Chicago Press

  • Article cited by Judge Dowd in the legal case Forbush v. Adams, [2014] No. ED101290, Missouri Court of Appeals, Easter District - U.S.A. 
  • Article featured in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation (2013)

Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions. In Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum, eds., The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law & Economics. (2018). Edward Elgar Publishing

Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game (with Linda Babcock). The Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization53, pp. 401-417 (2004). Elsevier Publishing

Deterrence, Lawsuits and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors (with Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker). The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 23, pp. 57-97 (2007). Oxford University Press




Manuscripts

Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting (with Kathryn Spier, Harvard University). Manuscript (2022)

Optimal Civil Justice Institutions (with Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov, Higher School of Economics and Penn State University). Manuscript (2022)



Work In Progress

Debiasing through Law: An Experimental Study of Unrealistic Optimism and Consumer Safety Law (with Christine Jolls). University of Alberta and Yale University

Optimal Criminal Justice Mechanisms (with Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov). University of Alberta, Higher School of Economics and Penn State University

Optimal Design of Litigation Finance Institutions (with Maxim Nikitin). University of Alberta and Higher School of Economics 

Corruption and Leniency Policies: Theory and Experimental Evidence. University of Alberta 
















Teaching

  

Courses

ECON 384 - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II

Designed for majors and Honors students in Economics. Extensions and applications of microeconomic theory: intertemporal choice, risk, uncertainty and expected utility; oligopoly and game theory; externalities, public goods, adverse selection, moral hazard, and asymmetric information; general equilibrium. Prerequisites: ECON 109, ECON 281 and 299 or equivalent, and MATH 156 or equivalent.


ECON 484 - Game Theory and Economic Applications

Analysis of structure and equilibrium of games. Applications to economic problems such as bargaining, auctions and collusion. Prerequisites: ECON 109, ECON 384 and 299 or equivalent.


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